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In The Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
AMERICAN GYPSUM TRUST, a common law
trust, and JOHN PAUL JONES, S. LEWIS
CRANDALL, JOHN RUSSELL RITTER,
DONALD W. McEWEN and BARRY
PHILLIPS,
Plaintiffs-Respondents.

- vs. -

Case No. 12887

GEORGIA-PACIFIC CORPORATION, a corporation,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS, AMERICAN GYPSUM
TRUST, JOHN PAUL JONES, S. LEWIS
CRANDALL, JOHN RUSSELL RITTER,
DONALD W. McEWEN AND
BARRY PHILLIPS

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action for recovery of moneys due and owing
under and by reason of the breach by Georgia-Pacific Corporation ("Georgia-Pacific") of a "Fifty-Year Lease" between

,
plaintiffs as lessors and Georgia-Paci fie as lessee by rnesne
assignments, for damages for defendants' violations of Section
50-1-2, Utah Code Annotated. 1953. for declaratory relief. and
for attorneys' fees and costs. Georgia-Pacific counterclaimed.
asserting that it had erroneously overpaid amounts owing
under the "Fifty-Year Lease:· and that the overpayment
should be refunded.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The action was dismissed as to the two individual
defendants. Dean Hansen and Floyd Hummel. The Trial Court.
Honorable Ferdinand Erickson, District Judge. made and
entered detailed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. and
Judgment based thereon, holding as follows:
1.

On plaintiffs' claim for moneys owing under the

"Fifty-Year Lease," that Georgia-Pacific had breached the
lease and owed plaintiffs thereunder the sum of $315.724.18.
plus interest;
2.

On plaintiffs' claim for damages for violation of

Section 50-1-2, U.C.A., 1953. that plaintiffs had not established such claim:
3.

On plaintiffs' claim for declaratory relief, that

Georgia-Pacific would be required to "operate the Sigurd Plant
at not less than 128,539 ,000 square feet [the 1965-196 7
average production level] of wallboard per year, provided only
that Georgia-Pacific Corporation has a sufficient market to sell
that quantity of gypsum products in the historic marketing
area of Sigurd, as defined by Finding of Fact No. 27 .

"
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that such obligation would continue "until the Fifty-Year
Lease expires by its terms and so long as there are mineable and
processable reserves on the Leased Premises . . . ,"and that,
because Georgia-Pacific's records do not provide a proper basis
in themselves for computation of the sums owing to plaintiffs
under the Fifty-Year Lease, Georgia-Pacific must account for
its future operations as set forth in Exhibits 139-141, as
modified by the Judgment;
4.
On plaintiffs' claim for attorneys' fees and costs,
that each party should bear its own fees and costs;
On Georgia-Pacific's counterclaim, that Georgia5.
Pacific had not sustained its burden of proof, and that the
counterclaim should be dismissed, no cause of action.
Georgia-Pacific's notice of appeal was timely filed.
Plaintiffs' notice of cross-appeal, restricted to the Trial Court's
refusal to award attorneys' fees and costs to plaintiffs, was
timely filed.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiffs' cross-appeal seeks reversal of the Trial Court's
refusal to award to plaintiffs attorneys' fees and costs. In other
respects, the Judgment of the Trial Court should be affirmed.
ST ATEMENT OF FACTS

"No conflict of any proportion as to accounting procedures under the lease occurred prior
to the assignment to Appellant." (Appellant's
p. 11; emphasis added.)
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Although the lessee's interest under the Lease was held
by four persons or corporations prior to the acquisition by
Georgia-Pacific, and was operated continuously for nearly 20
years by them, Georgia-Pacific is quite right in its conclusion
that relations were amicable until Georgia-Pacific acquired the
Lease.
Plaintiffs' predecessor, American Keene Cement and
Plaster Company, as lessor, and Georgia-Pacific's predecessor,
Sid H. Eliason, as lessee, entered into a "Fifty-Year Lease" (the
"Lease") covering 110 placer mining claims and some 2,500
acres of fee land near Sigurd, Utah, on November 6, 1946.
After execution of the Lease, American Keene was liquidated.
and American Gypsum Trust was formed to hold title to the
leased premises as lessor for the benefit of the former shareholders of American Keene, who now number about sixty,
most of whom reside in and around Sevier County. (Ab.
186-187.) 1 From 1957 through 1964, plaintiffs received and
distributed to their beneficiaries an average of over $90,000 per
year in respect of their 7 percent net profits interest under the
Lease. (Ex. 135.)
When Georgia-Pacific acquired the lessee's interest under
the Lease in 1965, however, there was a dramatic change.
Almost immediately, Georgia-Pacific manipulated its operations and its records to show operation of the Sigurd Plant not
at a profit, but at a loss, and now even claims that no moneys
are owed to plaintiffs at all for 1968, 1969, and 1970, and that
it is entitled to recover back from plaintiffs $41 ,871 for alleged
overpayments in 1965-1967. (Ab. 285-290: Ex. 135.)
I For the convenience of the Court, the same record referenct·s art· used in this llrirf
as are used in Appellant's Brief.
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The most important provisions of the Lease (Exhibit
"A" to plaintiffs' Complaint) are these:
"Second: The Lessee . . . does hereby
covenant and agree to and with the Lessor to
pay rent as follows: ...
B.... eleven cents ( 11 ¢ ) per ton on all
rock re moved from said demised premises
[after November 7, 1966] ....
D .... a minimum annual rental or sum of
Twelve Thousand Dollars ($12,000.00) [after
November 7, 1966] .
E. In addition to the payment of the
rentals set out above in paragraphs "A" to "D,"
both inclusive, the Lessee covenants and agrees
to pay the Lessor as rent for said demised premises during the said demised term of fifty (50)
years seven (7%) percent of the annual net
profit of the Lessee, before deduction of Federal and State income taxes, but excluding
from the computation of said annual net profit
all net profits and/or losses of the Lessee from
the manufacture, sale or other disposition of all
materials and products other than raw materials taken from the demised premises and
other than products manufactured or processed from such raw materials ....
[Tl he net profit, aforesaid, shall be determined in accordance with sound accounting

6
principles in the gypsum industry, and lessee.
and his assigns. agree that the business operations shall be carried on in a prudent and
business-like manner for all interests concerned ....
The Lessee ... will keep and maintain
accurate records and books of account of all
operations ....
Fifth: The Lessee further covenants and
agrees to and with the Lessor that all gypsum
requirements of the Lessee or his assigns shall
be supplied from the demised premises hereinabove described, provided rock of the kind and
quality needed can be supplied therefrom ....
Eighth: It is agreed by and between the
parties hereto, that any instalment of rent
accruing under the provisions of this lease,
which shall not be paid when due, shall bear
interest at the rate of seven (7%) percent per
annum from the date when the same was payable by the terms of this lease ....
Fourteenth: It is mutually covenanted and
agreed that costs and reasonable attorneys' fees
incurred in enforcing the terms and provisions
of this lease shall be borne by the party who
breaches the covenants, agreements, terms and
provisions thereof.
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Sixteenth: It is covenanted and agreed
that no waiver of a breach of any of the covenants of this lease shall be construed to be a
waiver of any succeeding breach of the same
covenant, or any other covenannt."
As related on pages 4 and 5 of Appellant's Brief, the
lessee's interest under the Lease passed by several assignments
pursuant to corporate reorganizations to the present lessee,
Georgia-Pacific. At the time Georgia-Pacific and each of its
respective corporate predecessors acquired the lessee's interest
under the Lease, each of them executed an agreement under
which they covenanted that they would observe and comply
with each and every term, condition and covenant of the Lease.
(Ab. 529.) From the time the Lease was executed in 1946, and
until 1968, the Sigurd Plant was the only significant source of
gypsum products that was used by Georgia-Pacific and its
predecessors to supply the historic market of the Sigurd Plant,
namely, the Western United States west of the Continental
Divide. Small quantities of gypsum products were supplied to
the historic Sigurd Market from time to time from such sources
as the Union Gypsum Plant in Phoenix, Arizona, and GeorgiaPacific's Plant at Acme, Texas. (Ab. 64-65, 101-102,409-410;
Finding of Fact No. 12, C. 481.) These were minor supply
factors, however, and did not impair the apparent ability of the
Sigurd Plant to operate at an optimum level and sell its products at optimum prices.
Although the
decline in residential
gypsum wallboard not adversely affect

Western United States suffered a severe
housing starts - the principal market for
in the period 1964-1966, that decline did
gypsum product prices. (Exs. 135, 186;
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Ab. 902-906: Appellant's Brief, Appendix A.) By 1968, tlw
Western United States had recovered from that decline in
residential housing starts, and was enjoying a phenomenal
increase in demand for gypsum wallboard. (Exs. 187, 188. 189:
Ab. 895-90 I.) Notwithstanding that great increase in demand
during the years 1968, 1969 and 1970, however, the price of
gypsum wallboard dropped dramatically. As Appellant has
noted in Appendix B to its Brief, Page V, the price declined
from an average of $35.98 per S/M in 1967 to an average of
only $21. 92 in 1970. As is demonstrated hereafter, this price
decline bore a direct relationship to the increased production
and market penetration of Georgia-Pacific in the Western
United States.
In 1967, Georgia-Pacific acquired its Lovell, Wyoming.
Plant, and, in late 1967, began making substantial shipments of
product into large parts of what had formerly been the exclusive market of the Sigurd Plant. In 1968, Georgia-Pacific.
having increased the capacity of its Acme, Texas, Plant by 60
percent - to over 330,000,000 square feet per year - began
making large shipments into the southern part of what had
formerly been the almost exclusive market of the Sigurd Plant.
(Ab.515-518.) As a result of the infusion of the new
production, the new Acme production, and production from
other Georgia-Pacific sources, into the historic Sigurd Market.
Georgia-Pacific doubled its sales of gypsum products in that
market during the period from 1964 to 1970 (Ab. 101-102).
and increased its market share, because of that infusion, and
because such increase was necessary to absorb the increased
sales, from 13 percent in 1967 to l 6Y2 percent in 1970. (Ab.
100.)

9
The parties orginally contemplated and intended that
the Sigurd Plant, and raw gypsum from the leased premises,
would supply all the lessee's requirements. They were chiefly
concerned with the gypsum market in the Western United
States, and intended that Sigurd and the leased premises would
supply that market. (Ab. 185.) One of the original entrepreneurs, Sid H. Eliason, was the Sales Manager for United States
Gypsum Company for the Western United States. (Ab.
17 8-1 79.) That intended purpose was honored by the original
lessee, Mr. Eliason, by the first successor, Western Gypsum
Company, by the second successor, Certain-Teed Products
Corporation, and by the third successor, Best wall Gypsum
Company. Thus, from the time the Lease was executed in
1946, until Georgia-Pacific acquired the Sigurd Plant and the
leased premises in early 1965, and indeed, for two years thereafter, that original intent and purpose was honored. As
Georgia-Pacific has most accurately and perceptively stated in
its Brief:

No conflict of any proportion as to accounting
procedures under the lease occurred prior to
the assignment to Appellant." (Appelant's
Brief, p. 11: emphasis added.)
Between 1967 and 1970, however, the Acme, Texas, Plant of
Georgia-Pacific was given the entire southern part of the historic Sigurd Market; the Lovell, Wyoming, Plant of GeorgiaPacific was given the entire northern part of the historic Sigurd
Market: Georgia-Pacific cut into the Sigurd Market from others
of its plants: and the price for gypsum products fell dramatically in the Sigurd Market (the Western United States) to less
than 61 percent of the 1967 level. Thus plaintiffs have been
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reduced. if Georgia-Pacific's position is adopted by this Court
in preference to the facts as found by the Trial Court. from an
average revenue of S90.000 per year from the 7 percent net
profits interest. to zero.
INTRODUCTIO/\; TO
Before arguing the points raised by Georgia-Pacific on
this appeal and the single point raised on the cross-appeal. it is
worthy of note that there is not a single argument on any prin·
ciple of law involved in any of Georgia-Pacific's claims of error
All of its claims of error relate to the facts found by the Trial
Court.
The Findings of Fact made by the Trial Court will not be
disturbed on appeal, and "are presumed to be correct" unless
"in error and shown to be such by material. 1111co11rrorerred
evidence." CG. Hannan Co. r. Llu.id, _ _ U.2d __ . 499 P
2d 124 (1972 ); emphasis added.
Indeed, Georgia-Pacific attacks only a few of the man)
facts found by the Trial Court. Georgia-Pacific's Brief mentions
only seven of the Trial Court's thirty-four findings. and attacks
only six of the seven. The Trial Court's Findings and Conclu·
sions are. of course. an integrated whole. The Findings attacked
are supported by many Findings not criticized: and Findings of
which Georgia-Pacific does not complain at all could not
possibly be reconciled with Georgia-Pacific's arguments.
Georgia-Pacific in fact seeks a re-trial of isolated parh of
this action by the Supreme Court. This Court has many times
held that its appellate funl'tion does not o tend
the re-trial (1f
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the evidence but is limited to a consideration of errors of law
claimed to have been made by the Trial Court. E.g., First
Western Fidelity v. Gibbons and Reed Co., 27 U.2d 1, 3, 492
P.2d 132 (1971 );Achter v. Maw, 27 U.2d 149, 153, 493 P.2d
989 ( 1972); Ewell and Son, Inc. v. Salt Lake City Corp., 27
U.2d 188, 192, 196, 493 P.2d 1283 (1972); Hardy v.
Hendrickson, 27 U.2d 286, 288, 495 P.2d 811 (1972);
Pollesche v. Transamerican Insurance Co., 27 U.2d 430,
433-34, 497 P.2d 236 ( 1972). No such errors of law are urged
by Georgia-Pacific.
All of the Findings of Fact attacked by Georgia-Pacific
are amply supported by the record. Georgia-Pacific's appeal is
based upon a carefully edited statement of a small part of the
evidence that never mentions, and certainly never engages, the
overwhelming evidence that supports the Trial Court's Findings. As this Court has held when faced with a similar argument,
an appellant may not "recite evidence most favorable to its
contention to the exclusion of other evidence favorable to the"
Trial Court's Findings. Thomson v. Condas, 27 U.2d 129, 132,
493 P.2d 639 (1972).
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT
ERR EITHER LEGALLY OR
FACTUALLY IN ENTERING ITS
FINDING OF FACT NO. 27 AND
BY FAILING TO ADOPT APPELLANT'S PROPOSED FINDING
V(2).

The anomalous results that Georgia-Pacific urges occurred at the Sigurd Plant are the results of precisely the kind of
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manipulative misconduct that the requirements provision of
the Lease, paragraph Fifth thereof, was designed to prevent
Georgia-Pacific tried to persuade the Trial Court, and now
would have this Court believe, wholly without foundation in
this record and contrary to logic and simple common sense.
that the price decline that occurred in 1968-1970 resulted from
a decline in residential housing starts in the Western United
States that occurred in 1964-1966. Yet even Georgia-Pacific
itself has acknowledged the very direct relationship between
the price of gypsum products and the immediate demand for
housing. (Appellant's Brief, Page 9.) As a matter of fact, there
was no significant decline in the price of gypsum products in
the Western United States during the severe 1964-1966 decline
in housing demand. In the period 1962-1964, used by the Trial
Court as a base for computing plaintiffs' damages, the average
price of gypsum wallboard sold from the Sigurd Plant was
$35.03 per 1,000 square feet ("S/M"). ln 1965, the price was
$3 l.08 per S/M. In 1966, the price was $35.44 per S/M. (Ex.
186.) Indeed, in 1967, the price increased to $36.91 per S/M.
(Ex. 186.) The precipitous decline in prices in the Sigurd
Market occurred after 1967, in the 1968-1970 period, when
the number of residential housing starts in the Sigurd Market
rose 52.33 percent, although the number of residential housing
starts throughout the rest of the United States was rising only
19.20 percent (Exs. 188, 189). During the same 1968-1970
period, gypsum prices in the rest of the United States, however,
declined much less than in the Sigurd Market. (Ex. 141.) No
amount of sophistry can cloud the unalterable fact that the
only significant demand or supply events that took place in the
Sigurd Market during the 1968-1970 period were these:
1.

The dramatic increase in the number of residential
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housing starts, which should have resulted in a greatly increased
price for gypsum products, but did not; and
2.
The addition of Georgia-Pacific's Lovell, Wyoming,
Plant, the 60 percent increase in its Acme, Texas, Plant capacity, and shipments from other Georgia-Pacific sources into the
Sigurd Market, together with the doubling of Georgia-Pacific's
share of the gypsum market in the Sigurd Market, with the
resultant 40 percent decline in gypsum prices.
Georgia-Pacific devotes six pages of its Brief to the
proposition that "it is a basic principle of contract law that
courts are not at liberty to rewrite contracts under the guise of
construing its terms and provisions." (Appellant's Brief, Page
18.) Contrast the result urged by Georgia-Pacific with the result
reached by the Trial Court. The Lease requires the lessee to
obtain all of its requirements of gypsum from the leased premises so long as rock of the kind and quality needed is available.
The Trial Court found that, at the very least, that provision
requires Georgia-Pacific as the lessee to operate the Sigurd
Plant at the average of its 1965-1967 production (being less
than 88 percent of the Plant's installed practicable capacity)
and to take its requirements for such operations from the
leased premises, so long as Georgia-Pacific has sufficient market
to sell that quantity of gypsum products in the historic Sigurd
Plant market area and so Jong as rock of the kind and quality
needed is available on the leased premises.
Plaintiffs believe that the Trial Court's ruling involves an
undue restriction upon and narrowing of the meaning and
effect of the requirements provision of the Lease. It is, however, apparent that if the requirements provision of the Lease
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means anything, it means at least what the Trial Court held it to
mean.
Georgia-Pacific, on the other hand, urges that the requirements provision means nothing - that it is not even a part
of the Lease. It argues to this Court, as it did to the Trial Court.
that it need not operate the Sigurd Plant at all, that it need not
take any rock at all from the leased premises, and that it has the
unfettered discretion to take the market developed from the
Sigurd Plant and leased premises and supply it from whatever
source may be to the economic interest of Georgia-Pacific.
A fair rhetorical question surely is, "who proposes the
rewriting of the contract?" Did the Trial Court rewrite the
contract when it applied to a provision of the contract the most
restrictive and narrow possible meaning that it can be given? Or
does Georgia-Pacific propose to rewrite the contract by simply
"blue-penciling" the requirements provision out of the Lease'1
One final comment on this point should be made concerning Georgia-Pacific's argument of estoppel. (Appellant's
Brief, Pages 34-36.) Suffice it to say that Georgia-Pacific did
not plead estoppel, which is an affirmative defense required to
be pleaded (Rule 8(c), Utah R. Civ. P.), either in its original
answer or in its answer to plaintiff's Amendment to Complaint,
that in the Pre-Trial Order no issue was reserved on the question
of estoppel, and that the estoppel argument was never
presented to the Trial Court for decision. Georgia-Pacific did
not even propose a finding of fact or a conclusion of law relative to this newly-claimed estoppel. As this Court has held,
"This Court will not consider a matter raised for the first time
on appeal." State, By and Through Its Road Commission i·
Larken, 27 U.2d 295, 300, 495 P.2d 817 ( 1972 ).
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Moreover, the provisions of the Lease itself preclude a
finding of estoppel. In order to "blue-pencil" the requirements
provision out of the Lease by estoppel, Georgia-Pacific must
find some theory, as yet unborn, upon which to "blue-pencil"
the 16th section of the Lease, which provides that "no waiver
of a breach of any of the covenants of this lease shall be construed to be a waiver of any succeeding breach of the same
covenant, or any other covenant." Finally, there is simply no
evidence that would have supported the estoppel argument,
even had it been made.
The requirements provision is a part of the Lease. It must
mean something. If it means anything, it means at least what the
Trial Court held it to mean. Accordingly, there was no error on
the part of the Trial Court in entering its Finding of Fact No.
27, or in entering Findings of Fact Nos. 9 through 17 that are
not criticized or attacked by Georgia-Pacific, but that are
bound up with Finding No. 27, and would be wholly inconsistent with Georgia-Pacific's proposed alternative to Finding No.
27.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT
ERR IN ITS FINDINGS OF FACT 8
AND 16 AND IN ITS FAILURE TO
ADOPT THE THEORY STATED IN
APPELLANT'S FINDING OF
FACTV(6).
In arguing this point, Georgia-Pacific contends that the
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Sigurd Plant had no defined historic marketing area. Its
argument is grounded in the following assertions:

1.
In 1958, small quantities of gypsum wallboard
were supplied by the Union Gypsum Plant in Phoenix, Arizona.
to the Arizona and Southern California markets. (Appellant's
Brief, p. 37; see Ab. 411 and Ex. 110.)
2.
In 1960, the Sigurd Plant was supplying all of
Arizona, California, Nevada, Oregon, Washington and Idaho,
and parts of Colorado, Wyoming and Montana.
3.
In 1963, small quantities of wallboard were moving
from Acme, Texas, into Southern California. (See Ab. 412.)

4.
In 1970 (the very period complained of by plaintiffs), the Acme, Texas, Plant was serving all of Southern
California and Arizona, and the Lovell Plant was serving most
of Wyoming and all of Montana, Northern Idaho, Northern
Oregon and Washington. (Appellant's Brief, Page 37.)
Need plaintiffs say more? From 1946 to 1967, the
Sigurd Plant supplied the overwhelming bulk of the gypsum
products required by Georgia-Pacific and its predecessors in
California, Oregon, Washington, Nevada, Idaho, Utah, Arizona,
New Mexico, Western Montana, Western Wyoming and Western
Colorado. Until 1963, the Sigurd Plant was the sole source of
gypsum products for Georgia-Pacific's predecessors for the
entire Western United States, except for a brief period from
1956 to 1958, when small quantities of gypsum board were
purchased from the Union Gypsum Company in Phoenix,
Arizona. (Ab. 409-411.) Even after 1963, when Bestwall began
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supplying the Southern California market in part from Acme,
Texas, Sigurd continued to supply most of that market. (Ab.
554.) Bestwall's 1963 marketing map shows the extent of the
Sigurd Market, which remained unchanged until GeorgiaPacific acquired Bestwall and, in 1967, decided unilaterally to
reduce the Sigurd Market to a fraction of its former extent.
(Ex. 1.) By 1970, the Sigurd Plant was left with Northern
California, Southern Oregon, Nevada, Southern Idaho, Utah,
and a small corner of Southwestern Wyoming. The Sigurd
Plant, in fact, was and now is caught in the gigantic pincer grip
of the "White Monster" 2 on the south and the Lovell,
Wyoming, Plant on the north. At a time when Sigurd was operating far below its ta pa city, and only needed orders, according
to Vice President Wilson (Ab. 57-58), Georgia-Pacific diverted
orders away from the Sigurd Plant to Acme, Texas, Lovell,
Wyoming, and Blue Rapids, Kansas (even though the latter
admittedly could not be cost-justified (Ab. 64-65), and even
though freight rates favored Sigurd over Acme, and were the
same from Sigurd and Lovell (Ab. 78-82)). Georgia-Pacific even
diverted orders under an "Exchange Agreement" from the
Sigurd Plant to a competitor's plant - Johns-Mansville at
Apex, Nevada - and charged the freight on these "non-orders"
to the Sigurd Plant, so that plaintiffs were charged this expense
with no offsetting revenues at all. (Ex. 41.) When quizzed
about the diversion of these Southern California orders to
Johns-Mansville, Vice President Wilson's testy reply was that
these orders could not have gone to Sigurd anyway "Because
we said that they weren't to go." (Ab. 521.)
It is admitted by Georgia-Pacific that it never gave any
consideration to the requirements provision of the Lease. Glen
Edward Wilson, Corporate Vice President and General Manager
2 The designation so accurately accorded by Georgia-Pacific to its Acme plant.
(Ab. 588.)
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of the Gypsum Division, whose duty it was to administer the
Lease (Ab. 38-40), testified that he had never considered the
requirements provision until the filing of the Complaint in this
proceeding. (AB. 5 14-5 18, 5 26, 5 28.) He said that he first read
the Lease and gave it "a good going over" in late 1968 and early
1969. (Ab. 5 27.) Georgia-Pacific, a huge conglomerate, ran the
Sigurd Plant along with its other gypsum operations on the
basis it considered best for the overall good of the conglomerate. In the words of Vice President Wilson, whatever "enhanced
the economic position of the Gypsum Division ... had to be an
asset to the Sigurd Plant." (Ab. 468.) Time and time again,
after Georgia-Pacific acquired the Sigurd Plant, Georgia-Pacific
has limited and narrowed the marketing area available to the
Sigurd Plant, without any consideration at all of the terms, purposes or intent of the requirements provision of the Lease.

At the time of the merger of Bestwall Gypsum Company
in to Georgia-Pacific in April 1965, Bestwall owned nine
gypsum plants located at Wilmington, Delaware, Brunswick.
Georgia, New Orleans, Louisiana, Ackron, Ohio, New York
City, New York, Grand Rapids, Michigan, Fort Dodge, Iowa.
Blue Rapids, Kansas, Acme, Texas, and Sigurd, Utah. (Ab.
40-41.) The Plant at Sigurd, Utah, was, of course, the only
plant located west of the Continental Divide. (Ab. 65-66.)
Sigurd was built for the express purpose of serving the market
of the Western United States. This intent was discussed among
and understood by both the principals of plaintiffs predecessor, American Keene Cement and Plaster Company. and the
lessee, Sid H. Eliason, and his associates. (Ab. 185.)
In acquiring the Sigurd Plant, Georgia-Pacific acquired a
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planL a gypsum deposit, a market, and marketing personnel. A
plant and a gypsum deposit are not difficult to acquire, but a
market and knowledgeable marketing personnel are of great
value. (Ab. 552-554.)
Under the Lease, Georgia-Pacific's predecessors had paid
plaintiffs and their beneficiaries more than $90,000 a year in
lease rentals during the period 1957-1964 by reason of their
operation of the Sigurd Plant and the leased premises. Quite
understandably, Georgia-Pacific determined in its own best
mterests to divert the historic market of the Sigurd Plant to its
increased production from the Acme Plant and the new production of its Lovell Plant. Thus, Georgia-Pacific "creamed"
the market for the benefit of its other gypsum operations, in
connection with which no profit rental or tonnage royalty was
required to be paid, and thereby engorged its corporate coffers
at the expense of plaintiffs and their beneficiaries.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT
ERR IN ADMITTING THE TESTIM 0 NY AS TO DAMAGES OFFERED BY PLAINTIFFS' EXPERT
ACCOUNT ANT AND BY MAKING
ITS AWARD OF DAMAGES AND
DECLARATORY RELIEF.
Georgi a -Paci fie attacks the testimony of Grant H.
Caldwell, a certified public accountant called by plaintiffs, by
arguing that Mr. Caldwell improperly "assumed" first that the
price decline of gypsum products in 1968-1970 in the Sigurd
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Market was caused solely by Georgia-Pacific in its operation of
the Lovell and Acme plants, and secondly that the Sigurd Plant
should have experienced profit levels in 1965-1970 equal to the
profit levels of 1962-1964. Georgia-Pacific's argument is false,
and a patent misstatement of the record. Mr. Caldwell developed the evidence, already discussed in this Brief, supra, pages
7-9, that established the following facts:
1.
A major decline in residential housing starts occurred in the Sigurd Market between 1964 and l 966.
2.
No material price decline occurred in connection
with gypsum products sold in the Sigurd Market during that
period 1964-1966.
3.
During the period 1968-1970, residential housing
starts were up over 52 percent in the Sigurd Market as compared with only 19 percent in the rest of the United States as a
whole.
4.
During the period 1968-1970, the price of gypsum
products in the Sigurd Market declined 40 percent.
5.
During the period 1968-1970, Georgia-Pacific
doubled its market share in the Sigurd Marketing area by infusion of the increased capacity of the Acme, Texas, Plant and
the new capacity of the Lovell, Wyoming, Plant, as well as shipments from other Georgia-Pacific sources such as Blue Rapids,
Kansas, and the Johns-Mansville Plant at Apex, Nevada.
In arriving at its findings and conclusions, the Trial Court
did not rely solely upon Mr. Caldwell's testimony, but relied
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heavily upon the testimony of Georgia-Pacific's own witnesses.
Georgia-Pacific's economist, James Rosse, testified in detail
about new plants that started in the Sigurd marketing area
during the period 1961-1966. (Ab. 630-631.) The record is
devoid of any suggestion by Rosse, or anyone else, that any
significant new capacity was added in the 1968-1970 period
except Acme and Lovell. Indeed, Vice President Wilson of
Georgia-Pacific testified that after 1965, several plants owned
by Georgia-Pacific's competitors were closed in the Sigurd
marketing area. (Ab. 439-441, 606.) Rosse testified, moreover,
that the price of gypsum products responded very directly and
immediately to changes in competitive conditions. (Ab.
615-616.) The part of Rosse's testimony that Georgia-Pacific
relies upon relates to the period of 1964-1966 when, in the
Sigurd Market, demand declined and supply increased.
Georgia-Pacific has no explanation, however, for the
1968-1970 period when, in the Sigurd Market, demand increased sharply and only change in supply was the greatlyincreased production and sales of Georgia-Pacific. One can
argue most persuasively on the uncontradicted facts, and the
Trial Court would have been fully justified in finding, that
Georgia-Pacific's infusion of additional capacity into the
Sigurd Market precipitated the price decline in the Market in
1968-1970. Even Georgia-Pacific's economist, Rosse, and
Georgia-Pacific's Vice President Wilson, admitted the impact of
this increased supply on the price. (Ab. 524, 630, 664.) Neither
Mr. Caldwell nor the Trial Court, however, went so far as to so
conclude. Mr. Caldwell testified, and the Trial Court found
(based on the entire record) that the infusion of the additional
capacity from Lovell, Acme, and other Georgia-Pacific sources
so affected the price of gypsum products in the Sigurd Market
that the price experienced in that Market in the period
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1968-1970 was an unreliable index for measuring plaintiffs'
damages. The Trial Court held, being most conservative on the
facts, that the rest of the United States, taken in its entirety,
constituted a more reliable index for measuring plaintiffs'
damages to the extent they depended upon gypsum product
prices, because demand was up only one-third as much in the
rest of the United States as in the Sigurd Market, and there was
no evidence of any material change in the supply of gypsum
products that rendered the market unstable, as had occurred
because of Georgia-Pacific's activities in the Sigurd Market.
Nor did Mr. Caldwell assume, as Georgia-Pacific charges,
that the Sigurd Plant should have experienced profit levels in
1965-1970 equal to the profit levels of 1962-1964. Mr.
Caldwell, as an expert accountant, testified that he had examined all of the financial records relative to Georgia-Pacific's
gypsum operations, with emphasis on the Sigurd operations.
for the period from 1962 through 1970. (Ab. 279-281,
295-297.) Mr. Caldwell found that there were no material price
changes during the period from 1962 through 1967. (Exs. 135,
186; Ab. 895-901.) Mr. Caldwell further found from his examination of Georgia-Pacific's own records that there were no
material changes in total costs of manufacturing, selling, and
delivering gypsum products during the period 1962-1970.
(Exs. 135, 138; Ab. 886-887.) Finally, Mr. Caldwell found that
during the period 1968-1970, there was a precipitous decline in
prices of gypsum products in the Sigurd marketing area. He
concluded, as would any rational person, and as did the Trial
Court, that if prices had remained the same and costs had
remained the same, profit - the difference between prices and
costs - would also have remained the same. Likewise, Mr.
Caldwell and the Trial Court logically concluded that profits at
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the Sigurd Plant would not have changed absent GeorgiaPac1fic's violations of the Lease, except as the price of gypsum
products declined in areas untainted by Georgia-Pacific's
misconduct.
It is well established that uncertainty in calculating

Jamages cannot be complained of by the wrongdoer who
caused the damage. "The wrongdoer must bear the risk of
Lmcertainty in measuring the harm he causes." Lehrman v. Gulf
Oil Corporation, 464 F.2d 26, 45 (5th Cir. 1972), citing

Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 327 U.S. 251, 265, 66 S.
Ct. 574, 90 L. Ed. 652 (1946), and Story Parchment Co. v
Patterson Parchment Paper Co .. 282 U.S. 555, 566, 51 S. CT.
248. 7 5 L. Ed. 544 ( 1931 ). That rule is even more applicable
where a major part of the wrong consists in failing to maintain
records adequate to compute damage, in violation of a contractual duty. The Trial Court measured the damages in the most
reasonable way and by the most reliable method available to it
in light of Georgia-Pacific's wrongdoing. As this Court held in
Morris v. Farmers Home Muta/ Insurange Co .. _ _ U.2d _ _ ,
SOOP.2d 505, 507 (1972),
"A large portion of our awareness and knowledge is necessarily derived from deductions
based upon our observations of existing facts
and circumstances. It is important to apply this
principle to the prerogative of the court as the
fact trier. He is entitled to make his findings of
fact, not only on evidence concerning direct
observations. but also to draw whatever inferences a person of ordinary intelligence and
experience could fairly and reasonably draw
therefrom."
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Georgia-Pacific's Point III is in reality part and parcel of
its first two points. Its argument is based entirely upon the
notion that in some fashion never stated in Appellant's Brief
the precipitous 1966-1970 price decline in the Sigurd M<trket
was caused by the 1964-1966 housing decline in that market.
Of course, Georgia-Pacific never really admits that its arguments are all based upon that notion, for the simple statement
of it demonstrates its weakness. Georgia-Pacific's argument, in
fact, is an exercise in sophistry that would mislead this Court
by misstating the record and misstating the basis of the Trial
Court's actions, and by making the arguments so loudly and
repeatedly that Georgia-Pacific obviously hopes this Court will
not notice that all of the "facts" that it relies upon occurred in
the 1964-1966 period, although the Findings of the Trial Court
to which Georgia-Pacific seeks to apply those "facts" relate to
the 1968-1970 period.
Insofar as Georgia-Pacific's Point III relates to the declaratory relief granted by the Trial Court, its arguments are
equally unfounded. The essence of declaratory relief is the
protection of persons situated as are plaintiffs and their beneficiaries from a course of dealing proven already to have taken
place and that will without doubt continue unless prohibited
by the courts.
The Trial Court did what it had to do. Its declaratory
relief is drawn narrowly so as to proscribe the very kinds of
ma nip u 1a tions of production, markets, prices, and other
factors that were the basis for Georgia-Pacific's argument that
plaintiffs' net profits interest under the Lease was worth
nothing after 1967.
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Georgia-Pacific's concluding argument on this point
surely must be tongue-in-cheek. It argues that under the declaratory ruling of the Trial Court "Appellant is obligated to
produce at the given capacity even though every foot of
gypsum board produced is sold at a loss. And even though it is
sold at a loss, and the Sigurd Plant shows a loss, Appellant is
obligated to pay to Respondents a profit royalty equal to peak
year profits ( 1962-1964 ). "(Appellant's Brief, Page 59; emphasis in original.)
Georgia-Pacific in fact claims that it has produced at the
Sigurd Plant at a high level during 1969 and 1970, and that
every foot of gypsum board produced was sold at a loss. That
claim, of course, is based upon the manipulations of GeorgiaPacific's books of account, the pricing structure, and the intracorporate manipulations found by the Trial Court and denied
implicitly, but never engaged expressly, by Georgia-Pacific on
this appeal. The declaratory relief afforded by the Trial Court
provides for subsequent changes in economic circumstances to
be given proper weight in determining the real profitability of
operations at the Sigurd Plant. Georgia-Pacific's sub silentio
suggestion that the Court's declaratory judgment relief does
not so provide is calculated to mislead this Court.
POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT
ERR IN FINDING THAT THE
APPELLANT HAD DEPARTED
FR 0 M A COUNTING REQUIREMENTS OF THE LEASE AND
FROM THE ACCOUNTING PRACTICES DEVELOPED AND
AG REED UPON BY PRIOR LESSEES.
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In summary, Georgia-Pacific's argument on this point is
as follows:
I.
Georgia-Pacific admits that plaintiffs and Georgia·
Pacific's corporate predecessor, Bestwall, entered into an agree·
ment that is still binding that provides as follows:
"All items below the gross profit will amount
to a pre-determined percentage of the cost of
sales. We suggest that this percentage be set
permanently at I 0 percent. ... The suggested
10 percent figure covers the charge for selling,
advertising, and administrative expense and a
credit for purchase discounts." (Ex. I 13.)
2.
Georgia-Pacific is entitled to claim the 10 percent
deduction provided for in Exhibit 113, and in addition to that.
is entitled either (a) to "transfer" gypsum products from the
Sigurd Plant to Georgia-Pacific's distribution division at a price
discounted substantially below the price at which GeorgiaPacific sells the products, or (b) to deduct, in addition to the IO
percent, the costs alleged to be incurred in selling the gypsum
products through Georgia-Pacific's distribution division.
Plaintiffs' position is that the letter agreement, Exhibit
113, means exactly what it says, namely, that the 10 percent
covers all "selling, advertising, and administrative" expenses.
Plaintiffs also contend that the letter agreement, Exhibit 113,
means exactly what it says when it identifies the items covered
by the 10 percent factor as those "below the gross profit" line.
An examination of all of Georgia-Pacific's financial statements
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in evidence in this case demonstrates conclusively that the
distribution division costs, all of which are and can be only
selling costs,appear below the gross profit line. (Exs. 122, 171,
172.)

Georgia-Pacific's attempt to characterize the distribution division costs as something other than selling costs is
almost amusing. They quote their economist, James Rosse,
who says that he would characterize the distribution division as
"an important inventory distribution function." (Appellant's
Brief, Page 63.) One ought not to be surprised that Rosse
would choose to refer to selling as inventor¥ distribution.
Selling is, after all, the way most inventories are distributed.
Even Georgia-Pacific's expert accountant, Wilbur Duncan,
admitted that the distribution division costs appeared - and
are required by generally accepted accounting principles to
appear - below the gross profit line on Georgia-Pacific's
financial statements. (Ab. 751-759.)
The second part of Georgia-Pacific's point IV is in reality
a reiteration of the first part of its argument, and is directed to
the abstract propriety of profit center accounting. As a general
matter, plaintiffs recognize, of course, that Georgia-Pacific
may handle its accounting in any way it chooses. It is obligated,
however, by the express provisions of the Lease to maintain
books and records that reflect the true net profit of the operations covered by the Lease. If Georgia-Pacific elects as a gigantic international conglomerate to utilize complicated and
sophisticated profit center accounting to handle all of its operation, that is its right. But if it does so, it must also maintain
adequate books and records as required by the Lease to show
the actual profitability of the operations covered thereby. This
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it did not do. An experienced accountant, whose expertise as
an accountant was repeatedly admitted by Georgia-Pacific and
its counsel, testified that upon examining all of the books and
records supplied to him by Georgia-Pacific, he found so many
intra-corporate transfers and allocations, and so many ambiguous and confusing entries, that he was unable to determine the
profitability of the operations covered by the Lease from those
records. (Ab. 279-281.)
Even Georgia-Pacific's Gypsum Division Controller,
Norman Foster, admitted that Georgia-Pacific's records are
inadequate to compute plaintiff's net profits interest. (Ab.
169-170.)
The Trial Court was, therefore, left with no alternative
except to utilize an historical analysis for the purpose of
computing the profitability of those operations during the
years since the Sigurd Plant was acquired by Georgia-Pacific
and the books and records manipulated and changed so as to
make any meaningful calculations of profit impossible.
POINTY
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN
REFUSING TO AWARD TO
PLAINTIFFS COSTS AND ATTORNEYS' FEES AS PROVIDED
FOR BY THE LEASE.
As noted above, supra, page 4, the Lease expressly provides that costs and reasonable attorneys' fees incurred in
enforcing its terms and provisions shall be borne by the party
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who breaches the covenants, agreements, terms or provisions
thereof. The Trial Court properly found that Georgia-Pacific
breached the Lease. Plaintiffs properly pleaded their claim for
recovery of attorneys' fees and costs. In conformity with the
prevailing practice, evidence as to the amount of a reasonable
attorney's fee and as to the costs to be awarded was deferred by
both parties until after the Trial Court rendered its decision on
the merits. The Trial Court's decision that each party should
bear its own costs and attorneys' fees precluded the presentation of evidence on those issues. Plaintiffs filed a timely objection to the Trial Court's finding that each party should bear its
own costs and attorneys' fees, and requested an opportunity to
present evidence. The Trial Court, however, overruled the
objections and declined to permit presentation of evidence.

The award of attorneys' fees and costs is not discretionary where such award is expressly provided for in a written
contract between the parties. The Lease expressly provides that
"costs and reasonable attorneys' fees incurred in enforcing the
terms and provisions of this lease shall be borne by the party
who breaches the covenants, agreements, terms or provisions
thereof." (Emphasis added.) The enforceability of such a
provision for the award of attorneys' fees is universally recognized. Annot., 77 A.L.R.2d 735 (1961). The cited annotation
includes several cases in which it has been held that because of
the peculiar circumstances of the case, an award of attorneys'
fees is not appropriate. This Court so held in Petersen v.
Hodges, 121 Utah 72, 239 P.2d 180 (1951 ). In that case the
Court noted "If it is necessary to bring suit to enforce the
obligations, which are treated by the parties as having accrued,
then attorney's fees should be awarded as a necessary incident,
being part of the agreement which is still in force." 121 Utah at
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77. The Court then went on to hold that because the suit was
unnecessary in that case, no attorneys' fees should have been
allowed. In this case, the Trial Court expressly found multiple
breaches of the Lease by Georgia-Pacific, and awarded damages
in a substantial sum. Accordingly, the Trial Court should have
awarded attorneys' fees as sought by plaintiffs in the Complaint, and the failure to make such award was error. Sec
Milliner J!. Farmer, 24 U.2d 326, 4 71 P.2d 151 (1970);Swain r
Salt Lake Real Estate and /m•estment Co. 3 U.2d 121, 279 P.2d
709 (1955);Forrester I'. Cook, eta/., 77 Utah 137, 292P.206
(1930).
Rule 54(d)( 1), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, expressly
provides for the award of costs as of course to the prevailing
party unless the Court otherwise directs. Although the Rule
leaves the matter of awarding costs somewhat in the discretion
of the Trial Court (Hull v. Goodman, 4 U.2d 163, 290 P.2d 245
(1955)), there is no basis in this action for the Trial Court's
ruling that each party should bear its own costs.
This Court should reverse the determination of the Trial
Court requiring each party to bear its own costs and attorneys'
fees, and should direct the Trial Court to receive and consider
evidence on the question of costs and attorneys' fees and make
an appropriate award in accordance with the evidence.

CONCLUSION
All of the issues raised by Georgia-Pacific on this appeal
relate to the facts as found by the Trial Court. This was a lengthy
and thoroughly-tried case. The abstract of the testimony is 946
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long. There were some 200 exhibits received in evidence.
The Trial Court studied the evidence many months before
rendering its decision. The Trial Court had the opportunity to
see the witnesses, to hear the testimony as it was offered in
sequence, and to see the exhibits in relationship to the testimony as they were offered and received. Georgia-Pacific
attacks only a small part of the extensive task completed by the
Trial Court in sifting and weighing the evidence and coming to
its conclusions in this case.
This case is a classic example of the wisdom and sound
policies underlying the well-established rule that findings of
fact made by the Trial Court will not be disturbed unless
wholly unsupported by the evidence or manifestly contrary to
the evidence. There is ample evidence to support each and
every finding made by the Trial Court. This Court is asked by
Georgia-Pacific to re-sift and re-weigh the evidence and make
new findings from a cold record without the opportunity to
experience the evidence first-hand that the Trial Court had and
took advantage of in deciding this case. This Court ought not to
undertake that task, particularly where the Trial Court has
done such a thorough, careful and exhaustive job of trying and
determining all of the issues.
The only error committed by the Trial Court is found in
the refusal of the Trial Court to award to plaintiffs costs and
attorneys' fees. The decision of the Trial Court should be reversed in this respect only, and the case should be remanded for
appropriate proceedings on the issue of costs and attorneys'
fees only. In all other respects the Judgment of the Trial Court
should be affirmed.
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